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Abstract 
Psychopathology may be understood better as a spectrum, as opposed to a 
dichotomy, and the traits that underlie this spectrum can shed light on the underlying 
mechanisms of the pathology. The personality trait Neuroticism, which relates to the 
experience and expression of negative emotion, is strongly associated with 
psychopathology; the aspects of Neuroticism—N-Withdrawal and N-Volatility—share 
variance but are also uniquely associated with different types of psychopathology. 
Intelligence and creativity are two other traits that are associated with psychopathology; 
intelligence is negatively correlated, while creativity is sometimes positively correlated. 
Some of this correlation can be explained through their relationship to Neuroticism and 
its aspects. The current study examined the relationship between intelligence, creativity, 
and the aspects of Neuroticism, as well as explored potential neural mechanisms of 
Neuroticism. N-Volatility was negatively correlated with intelligence, while N-
Withdrawal showed a curvilinear relationship, where subjects in the middle of the N-
Withdrawal spectrum performed best on cognitive tasks. However, N-Volatility 
positively predicted creativity—particularly artistic creativity—in some samples, while 
N-Withdrawal showed no or a slight negative correlation. Finally, N-Withdrawal was 
negatively associated with functional connectivity in areas of the brain related to 
emotional regulation and decision making. These findings suggest that personality 
mediates the relationship between psychopathology, creativity, and intelligence, and 
imply a neural substrate of Neuroticism. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Patterns of human behavior, cognition, or affect—traits—generally fall on a normal 
curve, with most people falling somewhere in the middle and relatively few falling on the 
extreme ends. In many cases, pathological traits are the extreme end of a normal 
spectrum of a trait—as opposed to a dichotomous trait, where a person either has a 
pathological trait or does not (Craddock & Owen, 2010; Wright et al., 2013). Traits 
reflect patterns of biological processes in the brain, and persons with pathological traits 
should have abnormal functioning in the brain. Thus, studying the normal biological 
processes that underlie a trait can illuminate the malfunction that occurs in the extreme, 
pathological form of the trait. Further, traits that are commonly associated with 
psychopathology may result from similar cognitive and affective functions that create the 
pathology. 
 Therefore, in order to better understand psychopathology, it is necessary to 
understand the normal function of traits that are associated with it. Neuroticism, as the 
personality trait most strongly linked with psychopathology (e.g., Ormel et al., 2004; 
Widiger, 2011), obviously bears closer examination. Since high Neuroticism is associated 
so strongly with certain forms of psychopathology (e.g., Kotov et al., 2010; Ormel, Riese, 
& Rosmalen, 2012), the association that other traits show with these disorders may in fact 
be causally related to Neuroticism, as opposed to the disorder itself. 
 Neuroticism correlates with almost all types of psychopathology (Kotov et al., 
2010); this correlation is so strong that Neuroticism measures can be unhelpful in 
distinguishing between disorders (Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004). Further, because 
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of the close relationship between Neuroticism and psychopathology, certain traits—such 
as anxiety—correlate so closely with Neuroticism that the terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably and likely relate to the same underlying cognitive and affective 
processes. At the neural level, Neuroticism relates to individual variation in responding to 
negatively-interpreted stimuli (Ormel et al., 2013); on a more cognitive and affective 
level, variations reflect differences in experience and expression of negative emotions 
(Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005; Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005; Matthews, 2004). 
Neuroticism relates to brain structures and systems that modulate sensitivity to 
punishment as well as negative affect (DeYoung, 2010). There have been myriad studies 
examining the neural correlates of Neuroticism; they have implicated the amygdala (e.g., 
Cremers et al., 2010; Holmes et al., 2012; Kim & Whalen, 2009; Omura, Constable, & 
Canli, 2005) and the cingulate cortex (e.g., Canli et al., 2004; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & 
Satpute, 2005), as well as other structures (e.g., Allen & DeYoung, in press; Feinstein, 
Stein, & Paulus, 2006; Haas, Constable, & Canli, 2008). It is clear that Neuroticism as a 
personality construct directly relates to neural activity. 
1.1  Aspects of Neuroticism.  
 The qualities that cluster in Neuroticism have been empirically grouped into two 
separate aspects: Volatility (N-Volatility) and Withdrawal (N-Withdrawal). N-Volatility 
includes facets like irritability and angry hostility, reflecting the outward expression of 
negative emotion (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson 2007). N-Withdrawal includes facets 
such as anxiety and fearfulness, reflecting inward expression of negative emotion 
(DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). Both N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal relate to how 
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individuals cope with threat, and individuals can be high or low on both measures. N-
Withdrawal generally consists of avoiding or withdrawing from possible negative 
situations, and N-Volatility relates to increased attention to negative situations and to 
corresponding actions (Cunningham et al., 2010). Both aspects correspond to the 
individual’s tendency to interpret ambiguous or neutral stimuli in a negative way (van 
Doorn & Lang, 2010). Measuring the aspects separately may capture more of the 
variance and account for contradictory findings for Neuroticism (van Doorn & Lang, 
2010). 
 There is also evidence that the two aspects are associated with differential 
behavioral responses. For example, in a prisoner’s dilemma paradigm, subjects who 
scored more highly on N-Withdrawal measures were more likely to cooperate, possibly 
because they had a greater fear of punishment or negative situations; this effect was not 
present for high N-Volatility scores (Hirsh & Peterson, 2009). Another experiment 
looked at performance with different levels of subject investment; for difficult tasks with 
a high level of investment, subjects who scored more highly on N-Volatility performed 
worse, whereas subjects who scored more highly on N-Withdrawal performed better (van 
Doorn & Lang, 2010). This could also reflect the association of N-Withdrawal and 
punishment avoidance. In many studies, the effect of Neuroticism on performance has 
seemed ambiguous, possibly because its aspects can have opposing effects (Bipp & 
Kleinbeck, 2011). 
1.2 Neuroimaging and the Aspects  
 Differences in the expression of the aspects are also reflected in brain structure and 
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functioning. Neuroticism has been associated both positively and negatively with ventral 
prefrontal cortex functioning in response to negative stimuli (Kennis, Rademaker, & 
Geuze, 2012), which may parallel the finding of the aspects’ opposing effects. DeYoung 
(2010) has hypothesized that N-Volatility is associated with the flight-fight-freeze system 
(FFFS), whereas N-Withdrawal is associated with the behavioral inhibition system (BIS); 
these differences may be reflected in variations in amygdala activation (Cunningham et 
al., 2010). The BIS is linked to passive avoidance (characteristic of N-Withdrawal) and is 
distributed between several different neural systems (McNaughton & Corr, 2004). The 
FFFS controls active responses to aversive stimuli, and it seems to make use of parallel 
responses in a similar neural hierarchy (Corr, DeYoung, & McNaughton, 2013; 
McNaughton & Corr, 2004). These systems are connected to emotional processing and 
subjective experience of negative affect (Ochsner et al., 2002). Like Neuroticism itself, 
N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal directly relate to neural activity; however, as Allen and 
DeYoung (in press) note in their review of the literature, very few neuroimaging studies 
have separated the aspects. As the aspects influence behavior in different ways, it stands 
to reason that these differences would be reflected in brain structure and functioning. 
1.3  Internalizing and Externalizing 
 The aspects are also associated with different types of psychopathology. It is 
important to note that comorbidity in mental illness—or multiple disorders occurring at 
rates greater than chance—is very high; as many as 60% of patients diagnosed with one 
disorder will be diagnosed with another in their lifetime (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, 
& Walters, 2005). This suggests that some disorders may share similar etiological bases, 
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as well as similar patterns of cognition, affect, and behavior. Two broad factors that 
correspond with different types of psychopathology are Internalizing and Externalizing. 
Internalizing and Externalizing both consist of a spectrum with multiple related disorders 
that share an etiological basis (Kramer, Krueger, & Hicks, 2008). Mood disorders and 
anxiety disorders fit on the Internalizing spectrum, while substance abuse, antisocial 
behavior, and impulsive disorders fit on the Externalizing spectrum (Griffith et al., 2010; 
Hicks et al., 2009; Kramer, Krueger, & Hicks, 2008). 
Internalizing is involved in the inward expression of negative emotion and 
heightened emotional response to negative stimuli. It is characterized by rumination, or 
repetitively thinking negative thoughts without taking action to alleviate them (e.g., 
McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Rumination is a core symptom of depression 
and anxiety disorders (McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Oppeneheimer et al., 
2012) but may be more related to vulnerability to anxiety disorders (Lopez et al., 2012). 
However, a general negative cognitive style—the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli 
as negative stimuli—more closely relates to depression (Rood et al., 2012). Both anxiety 
disorders and depression are highly comorbid, and share underlying genetic vulnerability 
(e.g., Kendler et al., 1995; Middledorp et al., 2005). In fact, depression and anxiety 
disorders may share substantial comorbidity precisely because of their shared underlying 
vulnerability and traits; they are highly correlated with anxious-fearful facets of 
Neuroticism (Kramer, Krueger, & Hicks, 2008; Tyrer, Seivewright, & Johnson, 2003). 
The comorbidity may be the result of shared psychological processes that manifest 
slightly differently across individuals (Krueger, 1999).  
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Like Internalizing, Externalizing consists of a spectrum where shared processes 
manifest in slightly different ways (Markon & Krueger, 2006). Externalizing accounts for 
shared variance between substance use disorders and antisocial behavior (Krueger et al., 
2002), as well as childhood antisocial disorders (ODD, CD) and ADHD (King, Iacono, & 
McGue, 2004). A number of studies have found that these disorders share an etiological 
basis (e.g., Krueger et al., 2002; Krueger & South, 2009) and that their genetic 
predisposition may become stronger in adverse environments (Hicks et al., 2009). High 
Neuroticism is associated with Externalizing, as are high Extraversion, low 
Agreeableness, and low Conscientious (DeYoung et al., 2008; Settles et al., 2012). 
Externalizing is also negatively associated with cognitive ability (DeYoung et al., 2008; 
Finn et al., 2009). 
 Neuroticism is consistently connected with various Internalizing disorders (e.g., 
Griffith et al., 2010; Hettema et al., 2006; Krueger 1999), as well as Externalizing 
disorders (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2008; Settles et al., 2012). Although few studies have 
examined the aspects of Neuroticism in relation to Internalizing and Externalizing, the 
Internalizing disorders share substantial variance and are closely related to N-
Withdrawal. Externalizing is broader than N-Volatility; it correlates with other Big Five 
traits, such as low Agreeableness and low Conscientiousness. However, it also 
encompasses angry hostility and outward expression of negative affect, which 
characterize N-Volatility. In relation to psychopathology, its most relevant traits may be 
aggression and impulsivity, both of which have links to N-Volatility (DeYoung et al., 
2007; Krueger et al., 2007). 
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1.4  Neuroticism and Higher Cognitive Functions 
The aspects of Neuroticism have not often been separated in existing literature, 
and they may affect cognitive and affective processes in different ways. This may explain 
why Neuroticism has contradictory associations with some traits. The present research 
focuses on clarifying the relation of Neuroticism to complex cognitive functions, 
including intelligence and creativity. There are some conflicting findings with regard to 
the associations between Neuroticism and the latter traits; separating the aspects could 
explain some of these findings. In addition, studying the links between cognitive traits 
and psychopathology could point toward mental processes that they share. For example, 
although the neuroscience underlying creativity is not fully understood, it seems that the 
cognitive processes that facilitate creativity may also facilitate pathological traits 
(Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich, 2007; Rybakowski et al., 2008). Since distilling disorders to 
their defining characteristics can help uncover the underlying neural subsystems, it stands 
to reason that other traits that correlate with psychopathology may also help illuminate 
these disorders. As intelligence and creativity are two traits that are linked to Neuroticism 
and have a significant impact on healthy life outcomes, they bear examination in closer 
detail. 
2.1  Study 1: Cognitive Ability and Neuroticism 
There is a robust negative correlation between intelligence and psychopathology 
(Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998; Raine et al., 1992; Rund, 1998; Snitz, MacDonald, & 
Carter, 2006), and, again, because Neuroticism is a personality trait that correlates with 
many disorders, its relation to intelligence could illuminate the specific processes that are 
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risk factors or protective factors. Studying intelligence might point to ways to maximize 
its potential—leading to better life outcomes—and studying its link to psychopathology 
may help in developing interventions for those who are at risk. The personality trait most 
closely associated with intelligence—Openness/Intellect—has a complicated relationship 
with psychopathology; the aspects of Openness/Intellect relate to Neuroticism in opposite 
directions (DeYoung, Grazioplene, & Peterson, 2012). This may account in part for the 
popular perception of the relationship between “genius” and “madness” (DeYoung et al., 
2012); although intelligence negatively correlates with psychopathology, this relationship 
may not hold true for the aspects of O/I. For example, psychoticism, a pathological trait 
that associates with psychotic disorders, is positively correlated with O-Openness, but is 
negatively correlated with O-Intellect; because of this, its association with the higher-
level trait of Openness/Intellect was suppressed (DeYoung, 2014). Separating the aspects 
of Neuroticism may also shed more light on its connections with other traits. 
 The first study examined the relationship between Neuroticism and performance on 
various cognitive tasks, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and 
Raven Progressive Matrices. The goal of study one was to determine the relationship 
between trait Neuroticism—as opposed to state neuroticism, or having a current mood 
that is more or less anxious—on cognitive performance. State neuroticism is well 
established to have a non-linear relationship with cognitive performance (the relationship 
resembles an inverted u-shaped curve; e.g., Beckman, 2013), but the relationship between 
trait Neuroticism and cognitive performance—as well as intelligence more generally—is 
not as clearly understood.  
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 Neuroticism has a weak negative correlation with intelligence (DeYoung et al., 
2014), but few studies have tested for a non-linear relationship. Non-linear relationships 
require relatively larger samples in order to find effects, particularly if the effects are 
small (Major, Johnson, & Deary, 2014). In one study, the authors expected to find a 
quadratic effect of g on a measure of emotional stability (or reverse Neuroticism), but 
found only a linear association in males, and no association (linear or non-linear) in 
females (Major et al., 2014). Another study tested the non-linear effects of Neuroticism 
on intelligence, but found the linear model was a better fit (Moutafi, Furnham, & Paltiel, 
2005). However, neither of these studies separated Neuroticism into its aspects; if the 
aspects affected intelligence or cognitive performance in different ways, each would 
effectively mask the associations of the other. Therefore, the current study examined the 
aspects separately. 
 In defining intelligence, many—including an APA task force—have emphasized a 
psychometric approach; although individuals often perform differently on different 
measures, the common factor g can be extracted, which may be the best fundamental 
measure of intelligence (Neisser et al., 2006). Tasks directly related to intelligence 
include various cognitive abilities, such as problem-solving, pattern recognition, 
inductive and deductive reasoning, and ability to learn from experience (Neisser et al., 
1996). The general intelligence factor (g) accounts for more than 50% of intelligence-test 
variance, an effect that is stronger for below-average ability subjects (Deary et al., 1996). 
This general factor is probably the best operationalized measure of intelligence. 
 In terms of personality, intelligence most closely relates to Openness/Intellect 
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(DeYoung et al., 2007; DeYoung, 2011; DeYoung et al., 2014). Data from a meta-
analysis are consistent with intelligence as a facet of O/I (DeYoung, 2011). O-Intellect 
correlates with both general intelligence and specifically verbal and nonverbal 
intelligence (DeYoung et al., 2014). Performance on both verbal and nonverbal 
intelligence tasks significantly correlate with O/I, and no other personality factor 
(DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). Although intelligence is protective against 
almost all forms of psychopathology, the relationship between the latter and O/I is not as 
straightforward. Neuroticism correlates negatively with the Intellect aspect of O/I, and 
correlates positively with the Openness aspect (DeYoung, Grazioplene, & Peterson, 
2012). Although intelligence negatively correlates with psychopathology, that may not 
hold true for O/I. The trait psychoticism, as measured by the Personality Inventory for the 
DSM-V (PID, a measure of diagnostic traits relating to personality disorders), shows a 
modest positive relationship with O/I (Watson et al., 2013). However, studies have 
consistently found a negative relationship between psychotic disorders (such as 
schizophrenia and schizotypal personality disorder) and cognitive ability (Heinrichs & 
Zakzanis, 1998; Raine et al., 1992; Rund, 1998; Snitz, MacDonald, & Carter, 2006). 
These findings may be explained by variance specific to the aspects of 
Openness/Intellect. 
 Bipolar disorder positively correlates with O-Intellect and shows no correlation 
with intelligence, even when it includes psychotic features (Quilty et al., 2013; Zammit et 
al., 2004). Subjects with bipolar disorder do suffer from certain cognitive deficits (e.g., 
Daban et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2006). One large cohort study found that men with 
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low intelligence were at the highest risk for developing bipolar disorder, but men with 
high intelligence also had an elevated risk; however, the risk was only for the disorder 
without any other comorbid disorders (Gale et al., 2013). Bipolar disorder, depression, 
and schizophrenia, share significant genotypic and phenotypic variance, and it is difficult 
to study them in isolation, considering that their frequent comorbidity most likely reflects 
their shared etiology. 
 Externalizing disorders are characterized by decreased cognitive ability, as well as 
by high Extraversion, low Agreeableness, and low Conscientiousness. Externalizing 
behavior relates specifically to reward-seeking and novelty-seeking—which typify 
Extraversion and O/I (Golimbet et al., 2007; Roberti, 2004)—while also relating to poor 
impulse control and lack of behavioral inhibition, which correlates negatively with 
intelligence (Alderson et al., 2010; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Kerns, McInerney, & Wilde, 
2001). Subjects with Externalizing disorders such as ADHD and anti-social personality 
disorder (ASPD) consistently score more poorly on intelligence measures (e.g., Bridgett 
& Walker, 2006; Kuntsi et al., 2004; Vitacco, Neumann, & Jackson, 2005). 
 The relationship between Internalizing and intelligence is more ambiguous. Lower 
intelligence is a risk factor for the development of depression and anxiety, but the 
mechanism is poorly understood (Gale et al., 2009). Rumination, or the propensity to 
dwell on a thought, idea, or emotion, is frequently observed in Internalizing disorders 
such as major depressive disorder or various anxiety disorders (Mellings & Alden, 2000; 
Michel et al., 2013; Muris et al., 2005; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). It would be logical to 
assume that ruminating, as a central symptom in Internalizing disorders, would have an 
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effect on cognitive ability, if only because ruminating is a specialized form of cogitating. 
Studies have also been mixed in this regard: while some have posited that rumination 
(and therefore Internalizing) enhances problem solving abilities, others have suggested 
that rumination will restrict working memory by increasing cognitive load, and therefore 
inhibit the ability to focus on other cognitive problems. 
A number of studies have demonstrated that depression, anxiety, and rumination 
harm performance on cognitive tasks across multiple domains, including social problem-
solving (e.g., Watkins & Baracaia, 2002), executive functions (e.g., Austin, Mitchell, & 
Goodwin, 2001), and memory (e.g., Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995), as well as 
learning and decision making (e.g., McAllister, 1981; Murphy et al., 2001). However, 
other studies have indicated that under certain conditions, subjects with depression can 
perform as well or better as unimpaired subjects (e.g., Ambady & Gray, 2002; Au et al., 
2003; Yost & Weary, 1996). Like most personality traits, rumination is best viewed as a 
spectrum, and those with Internalizing disorders would be at the far end of the ruminating 
spectrum. For those in the middle of the spectrum, rumination may improve complex 
problem solving abilities, whereas, at the extreme end, it would interfere and be 
associated with psychopathology. Thus, at a population level, decreased intelligence is a 
risk factor for Internalizing disorders; however, up to a certain level, rumination may 
have a positive effect on cognitive performance, which suggests a nonlinear association. 
2.2  Hypotheses 
 Considering the contradictory findings related to intelligence, cognitive 
performance, and Neuroticism, it follows that separating the aspects of Neuroticism may 
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shed light on the true relationship. Just as the O-Openness and O-Intellect aspects relate 
differently to different forms of psychopathology, N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal may 
relate to cognitive performance differently. N-Withdrawal is more strongly connected to 
Internalizing disorders, as well as their characteristic symptom, rumination; these have 
shown conflicting associations with cognitive performance in prior research. N-Volatility 
is more associated with the Externalizing disorders, which consistently have a negative 
effect on cognitive performance and intelligence. Therefore, N-Volatility is predicted to 
have an overall negative association with various cognitive performance measures.  
 Many general measures of Neuroticism have emphasized N-Withdrawal more than 
N-Volatility, and N-Withdrawal is also more closely aligned with common definitions of 
“state” Neuroticism (the tendency to feel emotions like anxiety; rumination; internal 
expressions of negative affect). One way to explain the contradictory findings regarding 
trait Neuroticism and cognitive performance would be through a non-linear relationship, 
similar to what has been observed with state neuroticism. Thus, N-Withdrawal is 
predicted to have a curvilinear relationship with performance on cognitive measures, 
resembling the inverted-u-shaped curve seen for state neuroticism (Figure 1). 
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2.3  Methods 
2.3.1  Participants. 
 Data were used from several preexisting data sets. Sample 1 consists of 234 males 
recruited from Yale and the surrounding New Haven community, including nearby 
colleges. The age range of Sample 1 was between 18 and 40 (M=23.6, SD=5.0), and 
approximately half of the sample was students; the rest had a range of occupations and 
incomes (see DeYoung et al., 2011, sample 2, for more details on the collection and 
demographics of this sample). 
 Sample 2 included 166 students (51 males and 115 females) attending a selective 
high school program in Cambridge, England; their ages ranged from 16-18 (M=16.9, 
SD=0.7; see Kaufman et al., 2009, for more information on the collection and 
demographics of this sample). 
 Sample 3 includes 305 subjects (151 males and 154 females) recruited from the 
Minneapolis/St. Paul community, primarily through Craigslist and other forms of internet 
advertising. The sample was primarily Caucasian (72%) and contained a variety of 
professions, with relatively few students (12%). The ages of the participants ranged from 
20-40 (M=26.2, SD=5; see Kaufman et al., 2015 for more information on the collection 
and demographics of this sample). 
2.3.2    Measures. 
Personality. Personality was assessed using the Big Five Aspects Scale (BFAS; 
DeYoung et al., 2007). The BFAS assesses personality at the level of the Big Five as well 
as the two aspects within each Big Five trait. The Big Five themselves have been 
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repeatedly empirically confirmed across studies, and are widely accepted in personality 
research (Digman, 1990). The Big Five traits can also be broken down into facets, or 
specific components of each trait—for example trust, modesty, and altruism are facets of 
agreeableness from the NEO-PI-R scales (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Naturally, each trait 
can be partitioned into any number of narrower components. However, one empirically 
based factor solution, analyzing 15 facets within each of the Big Five, suggested that each 
trait consists of two correlated, but distinct, aspects (DeYoung, 2007). When these 
aspects were correlated with genetic factor scores, the results suggested that each aspect 
relates to distinct genetic substrates, implying a biological basis for the factor segregation 
(DeYoung, 2007). The aspect scales on the BFAS were used to assess N-Volatility and 
N-Withdrawal. 
Intelligence. The WAIS is one of the most prominent intelligence measures, and 
its validity and reliability have been repeatedly demonstrated. Reliability estimates range 
from 0.7-0.9, and it also correlates highly with the Stanford-Binet test (Wechsler, 2008). 
It was originally designed as an intelligence test, and it measures cognitive performance 
in adults across a number of domains (Wechsler, 1958). In samples 1 and 3, the WAIS 
was used as a measure of cognitive performance. In sample 2, the calculated latent 
variable “g” was used as one measure of general cognitive performance. Latent “g’ was 
calculated using tasks from three domains of cognitive ability: verbal, mental rotations, 
and perceptual. The three tasks were the Differential Aptitudes Test (DAT; the verbal 
subtests were used), the Mental Rotations Test (MRT; rotation; this had a significant 
correlation of .43 with the DAT), and the Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test 
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(perceptual; this had a significant correlation of .53 with the DAT and .59 with the MRT; 
Kaufman et al., 2009). The Raven Progressive Matrices is often used as a measure of 
general cognitive ability, designed as a shorter alternative to the WAIS (Raven, 2003); it 
was also used as a measure of cognitive performance in sample 2. 
2.4  Analysis. 
 WAIS was used as a measure of cognitive performance in sample 1 (M=121.9, 
SD=11.7) and sample 3 (M=113.6, SD=15.4). In sample 2, the overall measure of “g” 
was used (M=0, SD=0.9), along with the Raven advanced progressive matrices test 
(M=21.7, SD=5.4), as WAIS scores were unavailable.  The Raven test is a good measure 
of general cognitive performance on a specific task, as well as a good marker of g; g is a 
latent variable representing shared variance in cognitive performance across several 
different tasks. 
 The three samples were analyzed separately, using the same model. First, scores for 
N-Withdrawal and N-Volatility were centered at zero to avoid collinearity with quadratic 
terms; they were then squared in order to calculate their quadratic term. Scores on the 
cognitive tasks were then regressed onto N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal, along with age 
and gender (except in sample 1, the all-male sample). In samples 2 and 3, the interaction 
between gender and the linear and quadratic terms for N-Withdrawal was also tested for 
significance. In sample 1, which included students attending Yale as well as members of 
the surrounding community, Yale-student status was also included in each model.  
 Each regression had three blocks. The first block included N-Withdrawal, N-
Volatility, and the covariates; the second block included those variables along with the 
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quadratic term for N-Withdrawal; and the third block included all variables in the second 
block along with the quadratic term for N-Volatility. For each block, the significance of 
the change in the R2 value was calculated, which tested the significance of the addition of 
the quadratic variables to the model. 
2.5  Results  
Table 1. Regression Model for WAIS Scores, Sample 1. 
 
Block 1 Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
β 
t p-value 
 Age 0.063 0.136 .027 0.467 .641 
 Yale Status 14.395 1.669 .497 8.623 <.001 
 N-Volatility -3.496 1.076 -.229 -3.250 .001 
 N-Withdrawal 2.055 1.125 .129 1.827 .069 
Block 2       
 Age 0.064 0.136 .027 0.472 .637 
 Yale Status 14.390 1.674 .497 8.598 <.001 
 N-Volatility -3.486 1.082 -.229 -3.221 .001 
 N-Withdrawal 2.031 1.148 .127 1.770 .078 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
0.107 0.970 .006 .110 .912 
Block 3       
 Age 0.064 .136 .027 0.470 .638 
 Yale Status 14.527 1.680 .502 8.646 <.001 
 N-Volatility -3.608 1.090 -.237 -3.310 .001 
 N-Withdrawal 2.089 1.150 .131 1.817 .071 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
-0.243 1.038 -.014 -.234 .815 
 N-Volatility 
(Quadratic) 
0.979 1.028 .057 .952 .342 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
Model Significance: R2 Change 
Block R R2 Standard Error R2 Change F-Change p-value 
1 .326 .106 1.85705 .106 6.873 <.001 
2 .327 .107 1.86081 .000 0.066 .797 
3 .327 .107 1.86477 .000 0.025 .875 
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Table 2. Regression Model for g, Sample 2. 
Block 1 Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
β 
t p-value 
 Age .110 .108 .078 1.025 .307 
 Sex -.440 .148 -.231 -2.983 .003 
 N-Volatility -.242 .106 -.210 -2.285 .024 
 N-Withdrawal .269 .120 .212 2.249 .026 
Block 2       
 Age .121 .107 .086 1.130 .260 
 Sex -.479 .147 -.251 -3.252 .001 
 N-Volatility -.225 .105 -.195 -2.136 .034 
 N-Withdrawal .274 .119 .215 2.309 .022 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
-.187 .091 -.154 -2.046 .042 
Block 3       
 Age .122 .107 .086 1.142 .255 
 Sex -.487 .147 -.256 -3.309 .001 
 N-Volatility -.243 .106 -.210 -2.284 .024 
 N-Withdrawal .265 .119 .209 2.238 .027 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
-.246 .104 -.203 -2.372 .019 
 N-Volatility 
(Quadratic) 
.120 .100 .104 1.198 .233 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
Model Significance: R2 Change 
Block R R2 Standard Error R2 Change F-Change p-value 
1 .303 .092 .851 .092 4.071 .004 
2 .339 .115 .842 .023 4.187 .042 
3 .351 .123 .841 .008 1.434 .233 
 
Table 3. Regression Model for Ravens Progressive Matrices, Sample 2. 
Block 1 Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
β 
t p-value 
 Age 0.447 0.661 0.052 0.676 .500 
 Sex -1.630 0.907 -.0141 -1.798 .074 
 N-Volatility -1.559 0.652 0-.223 -2.393 .018 
 N-Withdrawal 1.944 0.736 0.252 2.641 .009 
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Block 2 Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
β 
t p-value 
 Age 0.507 0.657 0.059 0.773 .441 
 Sex -1.858 0.906 -0.161 -2.050 .042 
 N-Volatility -1.458 0.648 -0.208 -2.250 .026 
 N-Withdrawal 1.970 0.730 0.255 2.699 .008 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
-1.093 0.562 -0.149 -1.947 .053 
Block 3       
 Age 0.511 0.658 0.060 .777 .439 
 Sex -1.885 0.909 -0.163 -2.073 .040 
 N-Volatility -1.514 0.656 -0.217 -2.309 .022 
 N-Withdrawal 1.943 0.732 0.252 2.653 .009 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
-1.283 0.641 -0.175 -2.002 .047 
 N-Volatility 
(Quadratic) 
0.382 0.616 0.055 .619 .537 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
Model Significance: R2 Change 
Block R R2 Standard Error R2 Change F-Change p-value 
1 .259 .067 5.227 .067 2.906 .023 
2 .298 .089 5.183 .022 3.789 .053 
3 .302 .091 5.193 .002 0.384 .537 
 
Table 4. Regression Model for WAIS Scores, Sample 3. 
Block 1 Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
β 
t p-value 
 Age -0.156 .174 -.051 -.893 .373 
 Gender 0.951 1.753 .031 .543 .588 
 N-Volatility -3.613 1.310 -.192 -2.757 .006 
 N-Withdrawal 3.883 1.480 .182 2.623 .009 
Block 2       
 Age -0.182 .173 -.060 -1.054 .293 
 Gender 0.965 1.735 .031 .556 .578 
 N-Volatility -3.696 1.298 -.196 -2.849 .005 
 N-Withdrawal 4.489 1.483 .211 3.027 .003 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
-3.492 1.306 -.153 -2.674 .008 
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Block 3 Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
β 
t p-value 
 Age -.0182 .173 -.060 -1.052 .294 
 Gender 0.983 1.741 .032 .565 .573 
 N-Volatility -3.777 1.386 -.200 -2.726 .007 
 N-Withdrawal 4.524 1.500 .212 3.015 .003 
 N-Withdrawal 
(Quadratic) 
-3.562 1.373 -.156 -2.594 .010 
 N-Volatility 
(Quadratic) 
0.204 1.221 .011 .167 .867 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
Model Significance: R2 Change 
Block R R2 Standard Error R2 Change F-Change p-value 
1 .191 .036 15.257 .036 2.829 .025 
2 .243 .059 15.103 .022 7.148 .008 
3 .243 .059 15.128 .000 0.028 .867 
 
 N-Volatility was expected to have an overall negative relationship with cognitive 
performance, and no non-linear relationship was expected. In all three samples, this was 
the case (Tables 1-4). The quadratic term for N-Volatility was not significant in any of 
the models and did not cause a significant change in the R2 of the models.  
 N-Withdrawal was expected to have a significant non-linear relationship with 
cognitive performance, and this was the case in two of the samples. In sample 1, the 
linear term for N-Withdrawal was not significant (p = .069). The addition of the quadratic 
term did not cause a significant change in the R2 value of the model (p = .797). Results 
were not different in sample 1 when Yale-student status was excluded from the analysis. 
In the other two samples, N-Withdrawal had a significant non-linear relationship with 
cognitive performance in at least one of the models. The non-linear model resembles that 
seen in models of the relationship between state neuroticism (or anxiety) and cognitive 
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performance; it is an inverted u-shaped curve, where subjects in the middle perform 
better than subjects on either extreme (Figures 2 and 3). In samples 2 and 3, gender did 
not have a significant interaction effect with either the linear or quadratic term for N-
Withdrawal. 
 
    
2.6  Discussion 
 In this study, the advantages of non-linear modeling are apparent, as these models 
better explain the relationship between N-Withdrawal and cognitive performance than 
linear models in two of the samples. The “inverted u-shaped curve” has been well-
replicated as a representation of the relationship between state neuroticism—current 
feelings of anxiety or negativity in the moment—and cognitive performance. State 
neuroticism, anxiety, or arousal is helpful up until a certain point with cognitive 
performance—as a certain level of engagement is necessary to maximize performance—
Figure 2. Linear and quadratic 
relation between g and N-
Withdrawal in sample 2, after 
controlling for age, gender, and N-
Volatility. 
Figure 3. Linear and quadratic 
relation between WAIS IQ and 
N-Withdrawal in sample 3, after 
controlling for age, gender, and 
N-Volatility. 
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but past a certain threshold it interferes. As Neuroticism represents a pattern of thinking, 
feeling, and behaving in particular ways, replicating the effects of state neuroticism might 
be expected. The state of mind that corresponds to higher anxiety more often occurs in a 
person who is higher in N-Withdrawal as a trait. The current results suggest that N-
Withdrawal is the principal driver of this effect; N-Volatility has an overall negative 
impact on cognitive performance that is not better explained through a non-linear model. 
It also reinforces the importance of separating the aspects; if Neuroticism was analyzed 
as a whole, it would mask the effects of the aspects and show little to no relationship. 
This may help explain some of the previous conflicting findings as to the relationship 
between Neuroticism and cognitive performance. 
 The non-linear model of N-Withdrawal also may explain contradictory findings, 
particularly with regard to Internalizing disorders, as well as a core feature, rumination. 
Rumination is closely related to N-Withdrawal; subjects who score more highly on 
measures of N-Withdrawal would have a tendency to ruminate more often. Previous 
studies have been mixed as to whether rumination aids or interferes with cognitive 
performance. The non-linear relationship between N-Withdrawal and cognitive 
performance would help explain these results. Rumination would have a positive 
association with problem solving, but only up to a point. This would also explain the 
negative association between intelligence and Internalizing disorders, which would 
generally include people at the extreme end of the N-Withdrawal spectrum.  
 Sample 1 unexpectedly showed no relationship between N-Withdrawal and 
cognitive performance; there was no significant linear or non-linear effect. Further, 
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gender did not show a significant interaction in the other samples; therefore, the lack of 
effect is not due to the fact that sample 1 is all male. However, sample 1 did show the 
same relationship between N-Volatility and cognitive performance. N-Volatility 
consistently had a negative, non-linear relationship with cognitive performance, which is 
in line with previous findings. Many studies examining the inverse relationship between 
intelligence and psychopathology have investigated schizophrenia and psychotic 
spectrum disorders (e.g., Khandaker et al., 2011) or Externalizing disorders (e.g., Bridgett 
& Walker, 2006), the latter of which is more associated with N-Volatility. Bipolar 
disorder is associated with lower cognitive processing speed as well, to the point where it 
has discriminant validity between patients with bipolar disorder, their unaffected first-
degree relatives, and the general population (Daban et al., 2012). Unlike N-Withdrawal, 
where cognitive performance is maximized in the middle of the spectrum, N-Volatility 
has a uniformly negative effect. 
Both cognitive performance and the aspects of Neuroticism can be viewed as 
endophenotypes for different forms of psychopathology. The concept of endophenotypes 
were initially developed in order to bridge the gap between symptoms and genetics and to 
measure more stable behavioral phenotypes. Cognitive endophenotypes related to 
working memory and processing speed have been used to relate neural processes to 
specific genes and specific disorders (e.g., Leiser et al., 2009; Wedenoja et al., 2008). 
Initially, endophenotypes were intended to link to specific genes, as this had proved 
difficult with disorders; this effort generally did not succeed. However, endophenotypes 
proved to have clinical use in their discriminant validity between patients and healthy 
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controls (e.g., Daban et al., 2012). N-Withdrawal and N-Volatility may also serve as 
endophenotypes; they are a straightforward phenotype that can be assessed reliably, and 
they relate to genetic variance (DeYoung et al., 2007).  
Separating the aspects is particularly important in identifying the etiology of 
different types of psychopathology, as N-Withdrawal and N-Volatility are hypothesized 
to represent different underlying neural processes. Further, their associations with 
cognitive performance suggest particular neural processes that may be involved in the 
disorders, and may, therefore, provide the neural basis of the relationship between 
psychopathology and intelligence. The effect of N-Volatility on cognitive performance 
suggests that the former may explain some of the basis of the negative association 
between intelligence and Externalizing disorders. The aspects can also account for some 
of the overlap and comorbidity in different types of psychopathology; for example, N-
Withdrawal as an endophenotype reflects the neural substrate of shared variance in 
Internalizing disorders.  
The effect of N-Withdrawal on cognitive performance helps explain previous 
findings related to IQ and Internalizing disorders, specifically depression, and suggests a 
possible non-linear relationship, which was demonstrated in two of the three samples 
tested. As with psychotic disorders, where traits like apophenia—or the tendency to see 
patterns and meaningful connections in random data—encourage creativity if they stop 
short of full disorder, which then interferes with creativity (DeYoung, Grazioplene, & 
Peterson, 2012; Michalica, 2010), N-Withdrawal may enhance cognitive performance 
until a certain point, after which the disorder such as depression interferes with cognitive 
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performance. On the other hand, N-Volatility has a uniformly negative association with 
cognitive performance; this is similar to cognitive processing endophenotypes associated 
with disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar, where there is a linear negative 
relationship between particular features associated with the disorder and cognitive 
performance on various tasks. 
3.1 Study 2: Creativity and Neuroticism 
Creativity is most strongly associated with the Big Five trait Openness/Intellect, 
as is intelligence (Batey, Furnham, & Safiullina, 2010; King, Walker, & Broyles, 1996; 
Silvia et al., 2009). Unlike intelligence, creativity has a stronger link to the O-Openness 
aspect, as opposed to O-Intellect (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a); however, this may hold 
true only for artistic creativity, rather than scientific creativity. Kaufman et al. (2015) 
found that O-Openness predicts creative achievement in the arts, while O-Intellect 
predicts creative achievement in the sciences. When the aspects are separated, O-
Openness predicts artistic creativity, but not fluid intelligence, and the reverse is true for 
O-Intellect (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a). Unsurprisingly, intelligence is also a good 
predictor of creativity, although the two also have unshared variance (Batey, Furnham, & 
Safiullina, 2010; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011b). 
 Creativity is commonly measured with divergent thinking tasks, self-reports of 
creative achievement or behavior, and personality measures (e.g., Batey, Furnham, & 
Safiullina, 2010; Benedek et al., 2012; Kéri, 2009). The second study will examine the 
relationship between Neuroticism and creativity, using the Creative Achievement 
Questionnaire (CAQ) as the primary measure of creativity. Creativity can be difficult to 
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measure, but the CAQ has a high degree of reliability, predictive validity, and convergent 
validity with other creativity measures, and is comparatively easier to score (Carson, 
Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). Although it is a self-report measure, the CAQ seems to 
accurately measure real world creative achievement (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). 
 Creativity has shown a contradictory empirical relationship with several forms of 
psychopathology (c.f. de Manzano et al., 2010; Rybakowski et al., 2008 as opposed to 
Dietrich, 2007). Some forms of psychopathology have shown positive associations with 
creativity measures (Acar & Runco, 2012; Andraesen, 1987; De Pauw & Mervielde 
2010). Further, specific white matter architecture in the frontal cortex is associated, in 
normal subjects, with variance in divergent thinking (a common measure of creativity) as 
well as variance in psychotic traits (Jung et al., 2010). However, other measures have 
shown a negative relationship between creativity and psychopathology (Dietrich, 2007).  
 These results may be partially explained by personality’s role as a mediating 
variable, with a personality profile that corresponds to higher creativity also 
corresponding to an increased risk of psychopathology (Barrantes-Vidal, 2004; Chavez-
Eakle, Lara, & Cruz-Fuentes, 2005); however, the psychopathology itself interferes with 
creativity, leading to conflicting findings. The cognitive processes that facilitate creativity 
also facilitate pathological traits, in that the same processes that make creative thought 
occur more often may also make pathological ways of thinking more likely (Dietrich, 
2004; Dietrich, 2007; Rybakowski et al., 2008). People who have certain facets of 
psychoticism (such as apophenia or magical thinking) may be more creative, up to a 
certain threshold—for those with full-blown schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, 
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their psychotic traits impair creativity (e.g., Michalica, 2010). This explains why traits 
related to the psychotic spectrum are positively associated with creativity, while 
psychotic disorders themselves may not be. 
 The mediating role of personality is supported by the fact that subjects with bipolar 
disorder still score highly on creativity measures when they are successfully treated 
(Andraesen & Glick, 1988; Belmaker, 2004). This suggests that the symptoms of the 
disorder themselves are not driving increased creativity; rather, a third variable accounts 
for both creativity and symptomatology or mediates the relationship between the two. 
Features of certain disorders may be beneficial for creativity, but may impair creativity in 
subjects who are over the threshold for a disorder; this could also explain why treating 
the symptoms of a disorder does not affect creativity scores. However, the role of 
personality is further complicated by the etiological connections between different 
disorders. Although disorders can share similar genetic and neural substrates, the 
disorders themselves are associated with creativity in different ways. 
 Bipolar disorder shares variance with schizophrenia and psychotic disorders, as 
well as with depression (e.g., Akiskal et al., 2010; Bramon & Sham, 2001; Berrettini, 
2001; Huang et al., 2010). Both bipolar and depression can present with psychotic 
features, and they are so frequently comorbid with schizophrenia that a separate 
diagnostic category—schizoaffective disorder—was created to describe the disorders 
presenting together (APA, 2013). The disorders share both phenotypic variance—
common outward symptoms (APA, 2013)—and underlying genetic variance (e.g., 
McGuffin et al., 2003; Purcell et al., 2009). Major depressive disorder shows substantial 
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overlap with other Internalizing disorders, especially anxiety disorders (e.g., Fergusson, 
Boden, & Horwood, 2011; Seligman & Ollendick, 1998; Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2010). 
Finally, both bipolar disorder and psychotic disorders are often comorbid with anxiety-
related Internalizing disorders (Achim et al., 2011; Akiskal et al., 2010; Buckley et al., 
2009; Cosoff & Hafner, 1998), the latter of which again generally show no or a slightly 
negative association with creativity (Silvia & Kimbrel, 2010). 
 To return to the personality profile underlying creativity, O/I (and specifically O-
Openness) is the personality trait with the strongest link; however, Neuroticism and its 
aspects may also be related. A meta-analysis of creativity research noted that artistically 
creative subjects tended to be more hostile and impulsive—components of N-Volatility—
compared to subjects who were higher on scientific creativity (Feist, 1998). Bipolar 
disorder is more strongly associated with N-Volatility, while depression is more strongly 
associated with N-Withdrawal (e.g., Quilty et al., 2012); bipolar disorder has shown a 
positive association with creativity, while depression has shown no or a slight negative 
association (Andraeson, 1987; Landen, 2012; Santosa et al., 2007; Silvia & Kimbrel, 
2010; Srivastava et al., 2010). The personality profile associated with higher creativity 
could be associated with higher Neuroticism (particularly N-Volatility), and therefore 
with a higher risk for certain types of psychopathology (such as bipolar disorder).  
3.2 Hypotheses 
 Setting aside the complex etiological relationship between affective disorders, 
anxiety disorders, and psychotic disorders, it is likely that N-Volatility will show a 
positive relationship with creativity, while N-Withdrawal will show a negative or non-
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association with creativity, as is the case with Internalizing disorders. The literature 
suggests that not only do the aspects of Neuroticism correlate differently with creativity, 
but the different domains of creativity may associate differently as well. One large-scale 
study—using one of the samples from the current study—found no relationship between 
either artistic or scientific creative achievement and Neuroticism (Kaufman et al., 2015). 
However, this study did not examine the aspects of Neuroticism separately as 
simultaneous predictors, which could lead suppressive effects, as associations with the 
individual aspects could be suppressed by their shared variance.  
 Building on previous research that looked at specific types of psychopathology and 
their association with creativity, it is possible that their underlying features—that is, N-
Volatility and N-Withdrawal—could account for some of this association and predict 
artistic and scientific creativity in similar ways.  Therefore, N-Volatility should have a 
positive association with artistic creativity, while N-Withdrawal should have no 
association, or a slightly negative association, mirroring the relationship between bipolar 
and unipolar depression with creativity. However, N-Volatility should have a negative 
association with scientific creativity, which is more associated with O-Intellect and 
intelligence (Kaufman et al., 2015)—and thus may relate negatively to N-Volatility, as 
shown in study 1—while N-Withdrawal should have no effect.  
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
 Study two used the same samples as study one, plus the addition of sample 4. 
Sample 4 consisted of 323 males and females recruited from the Toronto area, including 
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the University of Toronto and the University of Waterloo. Age in this sample ranged 
between 17 and 61 (M=20.7, SD=3.9), and subjects came from relatively diverse 
backgrounds (see Kaufman et al., 2015, for more details on the collection and 
demographics of these data). 
3.3.2 Measures 
 Personality and Intelligence. Sample 4 only included WAIS scores for a small 
subset of the sample, which were used as a measure of intelligence in supplementary 
analyses. As before, samples 1 and 3 included the WAIS as an intelligence measure, 
while sample 2 used the latent variable “g”. In all four samples, BFAS was used to 
measure the aspects of the Neuroticism and the aspects of Openness/Intellect.  
 Creativity. Creativity was assessed using the Creative Achievement Questionnaire 
(CAQ; Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). The CAQ is a self-report measure that 
examines achievement across 10 different creative domains. Subjects receive more points 
for higher levels of achievement; for example, in visual arts, subjects receive no points if 
they indicate that they “have no training or recognized talent in this area,” receive one 
point if they “have taken lessons in this area,” all the way up to seven points if their 
“work has been critiqued in national publications.” Carson et al. (2005) demonstrated that 
the CAQ has predictive validity, convergent validity with other creativity assessments, 
and discriminant validity from measures of intelligence. The domains can be divided into 
several subsets; Carson et al. (2005) used a principal components analysis to identify a 
two factor solution. The factors were labeled as scientific creativity (including invention 
and science achievements) and artistic creativity (including drama, writing, humor, 
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music, visual arts, and dance achievements). Analyses for study 2 used separate scores 
for scientific and artistic creativity, along with scores on the overall CAQ, which also 
included achievements related to architecture (which was not included in a factor; Carson 
et al. found that architecture did not fit on either a two-factor or three-factor model of the 
CAQ), and culinary achievements (which were excluded from the science factor). 
However, the overall CAQ scores are biased in the direction of artistic creativity, as there 
are more items relating to artistic domains. 
3.4 Analysis 
 All samples were analyzed separately, due to their different measures of 
intelligence. A generalized loglinear Poisson regression model was used, in which scores 
on the CAQ were regressed onto N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal, along with intelligence, 
O-Openness and O-Intellect, age, and gender (except in the all-male sample). In samples 
1 and 3, WAIS IQ scores were used to represent intelligence; in sample 2, g—which was 
derived from a number of cognitive tests—was used. In sample 4, only a small subset of 
the sample included WAIS scores (N=125; total N=323), so there was no control for 
intelligence. The Poisson regression was used because of the skewed distribution of the 
CAQ (Figure 4). Mean scores and standard deviations for the CAQ and its artistic and 
scientific factors are shown in Table 5. 
 Overall CAQ 
M (SD) 
Artistic CAQ 
M (SD) 
Scientific CAQ 
M (SD) 
Sample 1 22.1 (17.0) 17.0 (15.3) 4.2 (5.7) 
Sample 2 16.4 (13.2) 13.7 (12.7) 1.8 (2.8) 
Sample 3 9.2 (6.0) 6.6 (4.9) 1.6 (1.5) 
Sample 4 11.2 (11.0) 9.0 (9.8) 1.6 (2.7) 
  
Table 5. Means and 
standard deviations of 
overall CAQ scores, 
artistic CAQ scores, and 
scientific CAQ scores in 
samples 1-4. 
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 Regressions were performed using the Huber/White/Sandwich linearized estimator, 
which is robust to violations of the assumptions of standard Poisson regression and 
allows analysis of logarithmically distributed data that do not contain independent 
observations (Breslow, 1990). All variables were entered simultaneously in each model. 
In all samples, three regressions were analyzed: the CAQ was as a whole, and then the 
artistic and scientific domains. 
 
3.5 Results 
Table 6. Spearman’s Rho for CAQ total, arts, and sciences scores correlated with 
variables in regression models. 
 
 Sample 1 
 
CAQ Total CAQ Arts CAQ Sciences 
 CAQ Total - - - 
 CAQ Arts .906** - - 
 CAQ Sciences .368** .096 - 
N-Volatility .119 .138* -.043 
N-Withdrawal -.035 -.022 -.087 
O-Intellect .263** .198** .214** 
O-Openness .488** .472** .169** 
IQ .081 -.026 .293** 
Age -.005 -.087 .043 
Figure 4. Poisson distribution of 
overall CAQ scores in sample 4. 
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Sample 2 
 
CAQ Total CAQ Arts CAQ Sciences 
CAQ Total - - - 
CAQ Arts .946** - - 
CAQ Sciences .212** -.004 - 
N-Volatility -.043 .015 -.150 
N-Withdrawal -.062 -.038 -.009 
O-Intellect .168* .119 .315** 
O-Openness .313** .351** -.014 
g .000 -.042 .271** 
Sex .089 .184* -.251** 
Age .024 .019 .054 
Sample 3 
 
CAQ Total CAQ Arts CAQ Sciences 
CAQ Total - - - 
CAQ Arts .953** - - 
CAQ Sciences .568** .387** - 
N-Volatility .056 .069 -.062 
N-Withdrawal .092 .102 -.010 
O-Intellect .203** .149** .297** 
O-Openness .429** .447** .149** 
IQ .186** .150** .216** 
Age -.117* -.139* -.128* 
Gender .236** .185** .303** 
Sample 4 
 
CAQ Total CAQ Arts CAQ Sciences 
CAQ Total - - - 
CAQ Arts .939** - - 
CAQ Sciences .454** .210** - 
N-Volatility -.018 .035 -.193** 
N-Withdrawal -.106 -.073 -.147** 
O-Intellect .241** .174** .250** 
O-Openness .299** .302** .077 
Gender .000 -.005 -.011 
Age -.086 -.110* -.013 
Note. *Correlation is significant at p < .05. **Correlation is significant at p < .01. 
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 Table 6 shows Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the CAQ and 
CAQ factors scores and the other variables in the regression model. N-Volatility was 
predicted to have a positive effect on scores on the Creative Achievement Questionnaire. 
This was the case in three of the four samples; Table 7 shows results from samples 1-4. 
The exception was with sample 2, which was on average younger than the other three 
samples; however, age did not seem to be associated with the number of creative 
achievements (Kaufman et al., 2015). Sample 2 consisted of only students, which was 
also true for sample 4, but not samples 1 and 3. 
Table 7. Poisson Regression Model for Overall CAQ Scores. 
Sample 1 Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 N-Volatility .196 .0755 6.757 1 .009 
 N-Withdrawal -.077 .0814 .902 1 .342 
 O-Intellect .198 .1015 3.815 1 .051 
 O-Openness .473 .0919 26.551 1 <.001 
 WAIS IQ -.006 .0056 1.122 1 .289 
 Age -.004 .0087 .234 1 .629 
Sample 2       
 N-Volatility -0.031 0.099 0.098 1 .754 
 N-Withdrawal -0.159 0.107 2.217 1 .136 
 O-Intellect 0.132 0.119 1.241 1 .265 
 O-Openness 0.348 0.096 13.221 1 <.001 
 g -0.065 0.072 0.813 1 .367 
 Gender -0.057 0.098 0.344 1 .557 
 Age -0.141 0.133 1.128 1 .288 
Sample 3       
 N-Volatility 0.076 0.029 6.978 1 .008 
 N-Withdrawal -0.045 0.035 1.671 1 .196 
 O-Intellect 0.035 0.039 0.796 1 .372 
 O-Openness 0.371 0.036 105.802 1 <.001 
 WAIS IQ 0.005 0.001 11.987 1 .001 
 Age 0.000 0.003 0.001 1 .978 
 Gender -0.259 0.039 45.275 1 <.001 
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Sample 4 Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 N-Volatility 0.219 0.077 8.045 1 .005 
 N-Withdrawal -0.200 0.085 5.615 1 .018 
 O-Intellect 0.215 0.101 4.543 1 .033 
 O-Openness 0.283 0.092 9.486 1 .002 
 Age -0.035 0.017 4.567 1 .033 
 Gender 0.108 0.099 1.208 1 .272 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
  
 Figure 5 shows the log transformed overall CAQ scores in sample 1 correlated with 
N-Volatility, after controlling for age, O-Openness and O-Intellect, and WAIS scores; 
however, it should be noted that R2 statistics do not exist in Poisson regression models, 
and the calculated R2 value in the linear regression are skewed due to the non-normal 
distribution of CAQ scores.  
 
 N-Withdrawal was predicted to have no association, or a slightly negative 
association, with overall creativity scores. This relationship was not significant in three of 
the samples, and there was a significant negative relationship between overall creative 
achievement and N-Withdrawal in sample 4.  
 
Figure 5. Correlation between 
log transformed overall CAQ 
score and N-Volatility in sample 
1, after controlling for age, O-
Openness and O-Intellect, and 
WAIS scores. 
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Table 8. Poisson Regression Model for CAQ Artistic Scores. 
Sample 1 Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 N-Volatility 0.220 0.082 7.147 1 .008 
 N-Withdrawal -0.080 0.093 0.738 1 .390 
 O-Intellect 0.149 0.113 1.738 1 .187 
 O-Openness 0.612 0.103 35.584 1 <.001 
 WAIS IQ -0.016 0.006 7.099 1 .008 
 Age -0.016 0.011 2.271 1 .132 
Sample 2       
 N-Volatility .333 0.087 14.783 1 <.001 
 N-Withdrawal -.280 0.093 9.019 1 .003 
 O-Intellect .131 0.108 1.477 1 .224 
 O-Openness .394 0.092 18.436 1 <.001 
 g -.044 0.020 4.744 1 .029 
 Age .333 0.087 14.783 1 <.001 
 Gender .079 0.110 .512 1 .474 
Sample 3       
 N-Volatility 0.093 .063 2.187 1 .139 
 N-Withdrawal -0.068 .069 0.965 1 .326 
 O-Intellect -0.056 .083 0.450 1 .502 
 O-Openness 0.513 .076 46.080 1 <.001 
 WAIS IQ 0.005 .003 2.770 1 .096 
 Age -0.002 .010 0.055 1 .815 
 Gender -0.255 .078 10.769 1 .001 
Sample 4       
 N-Volatility 0.333 0.087 14.783 1 <.001 
 N-Withdrawal -0.280 0.093 9.019 1 .003 
 O-Intellect 0.131 0.108 1.477 1 .224 
 O-Openness 0.394 0.092 18.436 1 <.001 
 Age -0.044 0.020 4.744 1 .029 
 Gender 0.079 0.110 .512 1 .474 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
Table 9. Poisson Regression Model for CAQ Scientific Scores. 
Sample 1 Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 N-Volatility 0.154 0.136 1.269 1 .260 
 N-Withdrawal -0.202 0.145 1.953 1 .162 
 O-Intellect 0.227 0.174 1.704 1 .192 
 O-Openness 0.003 0.170 0.000 1 .986 
 WAIS IQ 0.024 0.009 6.572 1 .010 
 Age 0.013 0.016 0.682 1 .409 
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Sample 2 Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 N-Volatility -0.408 0.180 5.112 1 .024 
 N-Withdrawal 0.304 0.173 3.076 1 .079 
 O-Intellect 0.466 0.157 8.770 1 .003 
 O-Openness -0.139 0.186 .559 1 .455 
 g 0.113 0.149 .576 1 .448 
 Gender -0.097 0.166 .344 1 .557 
 Age 0.714 0.231 9.594 1 .002 
Sample 3       
 N-Volatility -0.014 0.077 0.035 1 .851 
 N-Withdrawal 0.070 0.089 0.613 1 .434 
 O-Intellect 0.362 0.096 14.171 1 <.001 
 O-Openness -0.036 0.090 0.160 1 .689 
 WAIS IQ 0.009 0.003 7.051 1 .008 
 Age -0.011 0.010 1.167 1 .280 
 Gender -0.355 0.105 11.336 1 .001 
Sample 4       
 N-Volatility -0.294 0.159 3.425 1 .064 
 N-Withdrawal 0.125 0.196 0.405 1 .524 
 O-Intellect 0.552 0.205 7.248 1 .007 
 O-Openness -0.157 0.209 0.566 1 .452 
 Age -0.001 0.025 0.002 1 .960 
 Gender 0.227 0.191 1.421 1 .233 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05.  
  
 N-Volatility was expected to have a positive effect on creativity in the Artistic 
domain, and a negative effect on creativity in the Scientific domain. N-Volatility did have 
a significant positive association with artistic creativity in samples 1, 2, and 4 (Table 8). 
It also showed a significant negative effect on scientific creativity in sample 2 (Table 9), 
and was approaching significance in sample 4 (p = .064).  
 N-Withdrawal was expected again to have no relationship or a slightly negative 
relationship with both artistic and scientific creativity. It had a significant negative 
relationship with artistic creative achievement in samples 2 and 4, and no other 
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significant relationships. In sample 2, it trended toward a positive effect on scientific 
creativity (p = .079). 
Table 10. Poisson Regression Model for Subset of Sample 4 with WAIS Scores. 
Overall CAQ Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 N-Volatility 0.237 0.094 6.319 1 .012 
 N-Withdrawal -0.329 0.105 9.711 1 .002 
 O-Intellect 0.113 0.138 0.675 1 .411 
 O-Openness 0.261 0.126 4.335 1 .037 
 WAIS Verbal 0.011 0.007 2.755 1 .097 
 WAIS Math -0.011 0.016 0.454 1 .500 
 Gender 0.230 0.164 1.974 1 .160 
 Age -0.065 0.024 7.478 1 .006 
Artistic CAQ       
 N-Volatility 0.276 0.109 6.402 1 .011 
 N-Withdrawal -0.350 0.120 8.470 1 .004 
 O-Intellect 0.055 0.152 0.129 1 .719 
 O-Openness 0.356 0.125 8.133 1 .004 
 WAIS Verbal 0.010 0.008 1.401 1 .236 
 WAIS Math -0.011 0.017 0.407 1 .524 
 Gender 0.033 0.174 0.036 1 .850 
 Age -0.078 0.027 8.527 1 .003 
Scientific CAQ       
 N-Volatility 0.070 0.269 .068 1 .794 
 N-Withdrawal -0.353 0.305 1.342 1 .247 
 O-Intellect 0.203 0.240 .716 1 .397 
 O-Openness -0.054 0.260 .044 1 .834 
 WAIS Verbal 0.020 0.011 3.590 1 .058 
 WAIS Math -0.007 0.033 .050 1 .822 
 Gender 1.143 0.295 15.013 1 <.001 
 Age -0.010 0.048 .041 1 .840 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. N=123. 
  
 All analyses were repeated with quadratic terms for N-Volatility and N-
Withdrawal. No quadratic terms showed significant effects using the robust standard 
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estimator. Results were similar when the smaller subset of sample 4, using WAIS in 
addition to O-Intellect, was analyzed, and did not differ from the sample overall (Table 
10). 
3.6 Discussion 
 Separating Neuroticism into its aspects—which have different associations with 
psychopathology, as well as distinct underlying neural subsystems—is important to 
clarify its exact effects on other traits; this approach is validated in study two, and 
suggests that analyzing Neuroticism as a whole can mask the effects of the aspects. Not 
only do the aspects predict creativity in different ways, they predict different types of 
creativity in different ways. In several samples, N-Volatility positively predicts artistic 
creative achievement, as well as creative achievement overall (which, in the CAQ, is 
biased toward artistic creative achievement), but has a negative effect on scientific 
creative achievement. N-Withdrawal had little to no effect on all types of creativity, with 
some samples showing a slight negative effect.  
 This pattern is consistent with previous findings that suggested that subjects who 
were more artistically creative tended to be more hostile and impulsive compared to 
subjects who were higher on scientific creativity (Feist, 1998). Hostility and impulsivity 
are closely related to N-Volatility (DeYoung et al., 2007). On the other hand, depression 
is more strongly associated with N-Withdrawal (Quilty et al., 2012), and depression has 
shown no association or a slight negative association with creativity (Silvia & Kimbrel, 
2010; Srivastava et al., 2010). Similarly, bipolar disorder is more strongly associated with 
N-Volatility, and bipolar disorder has shown a positive association with creativity 
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(Andraeson, 1987; Landen, 2012; Santosa et al., 2007; Simeonova et al., 2005). These 
findings also suggest that the aspects of Neuroticism may play a mediating role in the 
relationship between psychopathology and creativity; some of the variance is related to 
the underlying phenotypes that contribute to the development of the disorder. Again, this 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that treating bipolar disorder does not decrease 
creativity (Andraesen & Glick, 1988; Belmaker, 2004), suggesting that the association is 
not due to the symptoms of bipolar disorder. 
 These findings reinforce the importance of focusing on Neuroticism and its aspects 
as common underlying factors across different types of psychopathology. The etiological 
relationship between types of psychopathology (such as Internalizing and Externalizing 
disorders, or mood disorders and psychotic disorders) is murky and often poorly 
understood; the DSM categorizations of these disorders do not capture these etiological 
relationships. Neuroticism and its aspects are more measureable phenotypes that may 
reflect the complex relationships between disorders, as well representing the spectrum of 
psychopathology—as opposed to the dichotomies imposed by the DSM. The personality 
profile associated with psychopathology may represent a mediating factor in the observed 
associations, with a personality profile that corresponds to higher creativity also 
corresponding to an increased risk of psychopathology. If the development of 
psychopathology is associated with the aspects of Neuroticism, and creativity is 
associated with the aspects of Neuroticism, then psychopathology and creativity would 
appear to be related—even though the latter two may not be causally linked.  
 There were several unexpected findings in study 2. First, N-Withdrawal did not 
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have a consistent relationship with creative outcomes. It had a negative relationship with 
artistic creativity in two samples, and it actually trended toward a positive effect on 
scientific creativity in sample 2; however, overall, N-Withdrawal did not seem to 
influence creative achievement. This again reinforces the importance of separating the 
aspects when determining the relationship between Neuroticism and other traits; there 
could be suppressive effects when the aspects are analyzed together, which would 
prevent significant effects from being observed. 
 An alternative explanation for the lack of effect of N-Withdrawal on creative 
achievement is that psychopathology itself is typically associated with negative effects on 
creative achievement. N-Withdrawal may have a positive effect up to a point, but when 
psychopathology develops (for example, Internalizing disorders are particularly 
associated with high N-Withdrawal), creativity is impaired. However, the quadratic terms 
for N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal did not have significant effects in any of the models. 
This could be in part due to the non-normal nature of the CAQ data, which would make it 
more difficult to observe quadratic effects, particularly because the models used the more 
stringent robust standard estimator in order to control for any overdispersion and the non-
independence of the count data. A model with a normal dependent variable would be 
more likely to find small effects. 
 Conversely, N-Withdrawal may simply have a limited effect on creative 
achievement; this would also be consistent with previous studies where Internalizing 
disorders either had no relationship or a slight negative relationship with creative 
achievement. N-Volatility has a positive relationship with creative achievement in three 
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of the four samples, particularly artistic creative achievement (and a negative effect on 
scientific creative achievement in one sample); although it is again feasible that a non-
linear relationship exists (that is, that N-Volatility has positive effects to a certain point, 
and then has a negative effect), this was not demonstrated in the current study. Future 
studies may examine this possibility in more detail; however, it does appear that N-
Volatility is the driving force in the relationship between creativity and Neuroticism. 
4.1 Study 3: Intrinsic Connectivity Networks Associated with Neuroticism 
 Both structural and functional differences in the brain have been associated with 
Neuroticism overall, as well as the separate aspects. The final study will examine 
functional correlates of Neuroticism, using intrinsic connectivity networks as the primary 
measure. Intrinsic connectivity networks are related to the fundamental architecture of the 
brain, and reflect patterns of connectivity between regions—regions that are frequently 
active in synchrony are presumed to have more functional connectivity. The first resting 
connectivity network identified was the “resting state” or default-mode network (DMN); 
this functional network is particularly “active” even when the brain is at “rest” (Smith et 
al., 2009).  
 Functional neuroimaging studies first sought to identify regions within the brain 
that were active during specific tasks, and saw increases in particular regions, as 
expected; however, task-induced decreases in activity were also observed (Raichle et al., 
2001). This meant activity was greater in particular regions during the control or 
“baseline” state—the control condition measured brain activity when the subject was at 
rest, which generally took the form of a simple visual fixation task or lying quietly with 
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closed eyes. Thus, this baseline activity was dubbed the “resting” or “default” state 
(Raichle et al., 2001).  
 Resting state activity includes areas where activity increases during a task (task-
positive components) and areas where activity increases during rest (task-negative 
components; Broyd et al., 2009). The correlation in activity between regions suggested 
that task-positive activity was not the only measure of interest; functional connectivity 
between regions was also important, which could be measured through correlated activity 
in different regions. The patterns of synchronization—regions that are often active or 
inactive at the same time—reveal functional connectivity, which reflects the underlying 
architecture of the brain. In particular, correlations between regions that are active at rest 
appear to signify intrinsic connections in the brain, especially as they show synchronized 
activity across different resting states (Fox & Raichle, 2007). Synchronized activity in 
different regions was thus taken to reflect the underlying functional connectivity in the 
brain, where regions that are more often synchronized are able to communicate more 
easily, reflecting their intrinsic connectivity. 
 Intrinsic connectivity networks include the Default Mode network, along with other 
patterns of synchronization within the structures of the brain; they are a measure separate 
from either functional activation or structural components. In the third study, the 
networks were identified by an independent components analysis (ICA) and correlated 
with Neuroticism. The specific intrinsic connectivity networks chosen for further analysis 
were determined a priori, based on previous research investigating the underlying neural 
basis for Neuroticism.  
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 Individual variation in personality traits correlates with functional activity in 
neuroimaging studies, implying that the personality traits are markers of these neural 
systems. FMRI and similar studies have catalogued differences in brain structure and 
function that relate to high levels of Neuroticism. One issue with many existing MRI and 
fMRI studies of personality is that they are underpowered, or may not control sufficiently 
for non-independence of tests (Button et al., 2013; Vul et al., 2009; Yarkoni, 2009). 
However, studies that use a priori hypotheses and establish regions of interest can 
increase their power; larger sample sizes also increase power. Although false positive 
findings are always a risk, having strong a priori reasoning behind a study may be more 
beneficial than concentrating on eliminating false negatives, as the former can be self-
correcting (Fielder, Kutzner, & Krueger, 2012). Further, focusing on studies with large 
samples to find reliable effects can suggest a priori hypotheses that are more likely to be 
borne out. 
 Finding behavioral correlates of personality traits can be a useful first step in a 
priori reasoning—if a trait is associated with a particular behavior and that behavior is 
associated with activity or connectivity in a particular area of the brain, then that area 
might also relate to the trait. It also suggests a possible neural mechanism for the trait. 
One consistent finding is that subjects with high Neuroticism are more sensitive to 
punishment, and some studies have suggested that depression in particular is linked to 
decreased sensitivity to reward. This blunted response to reward actually predicts the 
development of depression (Bress et al., 2013). Adolescent subjects at high risk for 
depression show significantly less reward sensitivity (Foti et al., 2011). Other studies 
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have found that subjects high in Neuroticism avoid “risky” decisions and have increased 
activation in the insula region following a punishing response (Paulus et al., 2003); they 
also show increased response to uncertainty (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008). Subjects high in 
Neuroticism showed more activity in the right anterior insula when anticipating losses 
(Wu et al., 2014). Higher Neuroticism also correlates with higher reactivity to 
punishment (e.g., Thake & Zelenski, 2013). Hirsh and Inzlicht (2008) further suggest that 
individuals who are high in Neuroticism may be characterized by a stronger aversion to 
uncertain stimuli than to negative stimuli. 
 Subjects high in Neuroticism had more activation in the amygdala and the anterior 
cingulate cortex during situations with emotional conflict (Haas et al., 2007). The 
cingulate cortex-amygdala circuit is associated with emotional regulation and response to 
negative social encounters, and results from multiple studies suggest that this circuit is 
dysfunctional in subjects with higher levels of Neuroticism (Cremers et al., 2010; Haas et 
al., 2007; Ormel et al., 2013; Pezawas et al., 2005). This could signify that subjects with 
high Neuroticism have less control over their emotional responses. One large study found 
that individuals on the extreme end of negative affect showed an inverse relationship 
between the size of the amygdala and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex/medial PFC, 
suggesting that imbalance between the two corresponds with increased negative emotions 
(Holmes et al., 2012).  
 Further, other studies suggest that the impaired connection between the amygdala 
and the cingulate cortex in subjects with high Neuroticism decreases their ability to 
ignore anxiety-provoking stimuli (Ormel et al., 2013). Neuroticism was associated with 
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greater activity in the insula and anterior cingulate during experience of cognitive and 
emotional pain (Coen, 2011). Neuroticism also correlates with increased amygdala 
response to negative stimuli (Kennis, Rademaker, & Geuze, 2013; Canli et al., 2001; 
Wright et al., 2001), especially faces (Cremer et al., 2010; Haas, Constable, & Canli, 
2008). However, at least one very small study (N=18) suggests that the two facets of 
Neuroticism may predict amygdala activation differently. Cunningham et al. (2010) 
presented positive, negative, and neutral images in an fMRI; subjects could choose to 
press a button and “approach” the stimulus—which made the image larger—or “avoid” 
the stimulus, which made the image smaller. They showed that subjects with high N-
Withdrawal had increased amygdala activation to all approached stimuli, while subjects 
with high N-Volatility only had increased activation to negative stimuli, whether 
approached or avoided.  
Subjects who were highly anxious (which closely correlates to Neuroticism and 
N-Withdrawal) showed increased transient activity in the PFC compared to normal 
subjects in neutral conditions; in negative conditions, the activity in low-anxiety subjects 
matched that of high-anxiety subjects (Fales et al., 2008). This could imply that the 
anxious subjects are in fact using more of their cognitive resources; Fales et al. (2008) 
suggests that the reduced cognitive control of negative emotions is the result of greater 
working memory load in neutral conditions. Subjects with social anxiety disorder showed 
differences in resting state networks that included the anterior cingulate, the orbitofrontal 
cortex, and the angular gyrus, which may relate to the failure of emotional regulation that 
is present in anxiety disorders (Liao et al., 2010). Interestingly, both the PFC and the 
  47 
cingulate cortex were hyperactive in patients with depressive traits (Schöning et al., 
2009). This could imply a mechanism for the cognitive deficits. However, most studies 
examined Neuroticism or negative affect more generally, and the separate aspects of 
Neuroticism could have unique effects on cognitive functioning. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
The first regions of interest identified a priori as having a possible association 
with Neuroticism were the insula, the amygdala, and the rostral anterior cingulate—the 
insula because of its association with punishment and negative arousal (Wu et al., 2014; 
Coen, 2011), the amygdala because of its role in negative emotion and approach and 
avoidance behavior (Cunningham et al., 2010); and the anterior cingulate because of its 
role in emotional regulation (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011). These three regions have 
more evidence for their role in Neuroticism than any others (Allen & DeYoung, in press). 
An intrinsic connectivity network that included these areas will be the first analyzed. 
Psychopathology is not always associated with decreased connectivity scores in related 
ICNs—for example, a recent study found that addiction was associated with increased 
functional connectivity in the insula, which may relate to increased punishment 
sensitivity; on the other hand, it found reduced connectivity in areas related to impulse 
control (Wisner et al., 2013). However, for this study Neuroticism was predicted to have 
a negative association with connectivity in the first network (the anterior cingulate, 
insula, and amygdala) because of Neuroticism’s negative effect on emotional regulation. 
A second ICN that includes the anterior and posterior cingulate was analyzed, with the 
same effect predicted. 
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In order to further investigate the relationship between Neuroticism and cognition, 
two networks that have been linked to anxiety and are involved in cognition were 
analyzed. The third ICN chosen for analysis included the angular gyrus, which plays a 
role in arithmetic and visuospatial tasks (e.g., Göbel, Walsh, and Rushworth, 2001; 
Grabner et al., 2008). However, in addition to its role in cognitive function, it showed 
differential connectivity in social anxiety disorders (Liao et al., 2010) and was more 
active during a “worry” condition compared to a “neutral” condition (Servaas et al., 
2014). It also works with other regions to give context to memories, and is particularly 
important in social cognition; it plays a role in decision making and judgement, and 
especially in determining intentions of others through mental representation (Seghier, 
2013).  
Similarly, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is associated with decision making, 
particularly in response to rewards and punishment, as well as impulse regulation (Berlin, 
Rolls, & Kischka, 2004). Previous studies have found decreased resting state connectivity 
between the amygdala and OFC in subjects with anxiety disorders, which may related to 
their ability to process potential threats (Hahn et al., 2011). The same study found that the 
anterior and posterior cingulate may play a role in modulating this effect. Therefore, the 
final ICN chosen for analysis included the orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate. 
As before, it was predicted that Neuroticism will have a negative effect on resting state 
connectivity in these networks. 
Much of the previous research examining resting state networks and neuroticism 
has focused more on Internalizing disorders, which are more closely related to N-
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Withdrawal. Further, it would make sense that punishment sensitivity and harm 
avoidance are the underlying constructs driving the effects, which again are more closely 
related to N-Withdrawal. Therefore, for all networks, N-Withdrawal was predicted to 
have a stronger negative association than N-Volatility. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Participants.  
 The participants consisted of a smaller subset of Sample 3, described in study one. 
This sample included 244 subjects who had scans that contributed to the analyses. A 
smaller subset of the sample (N=218) which used a more stringent movement correction 
was also analyzed; as results were largely the same in both samples, the results for the 
larger sample will be presented. 
4.3.2 Measures 
 Personality and Intelligence. As in the previous studies, the BFAS was used to 
measure the aspects of Neuroticism, while the WAIS was used to measure intelligence. 
 Neuroimaging. The intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs) were generated using a 
meta-ICA pipeline to optimize network consistency (Poppe et al., 2013). This used the 
MELODIC (Multivariate Exploratory Linear Optimized Decomposition into Independent 
Components) function in FSL to compute group level probabilistic independent 
components. For each of the 25 ICAs, randomized subject order was used that included a 
smaller subset of the sample, due to both computational limits and the desire to reduce 
the likelihood of overfitting. A dimensionality restraint of 60 was chosen based on prior 
optimization findings (Poppe et al, 2013). The 60 components from each ICA were then 
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concatenated into a single file that was used as input for MELODIC. Procedures 
suggested by Kelly et al. (2010) were used to identify possible artifacts, such as those 
involved in autonomic functions, as well as possible artifacts created by movement 
within the scan. For the final analysis, 27 non-artifactual components were retained, 
using techniques outlined by Poppe et al. (2013). 
 During the preprocessing stage, motion correction and motion conduction were 
conducted in order to reduce within-subject movement.  A movement correction was 
computed; it is a summary statistic that reflects the average displacement across the six 
movement parameters (translational displacements along the X, Y, and Z axes, and 
rotational displacements of pitch, yaw, and row). This statistic, the root mean square head 
position change (RMS movement), is included as a covariate in all analyses.  
 In order to compute the network coherence scores—or mean connectivity scores—
for each network, a subject-level spatial map was derived for each subject using dual 
regression (Poppe et al., 2013 and Wisner et al., 2013). For each subject, the mean of all 
voxels within each group level map was computed separately for each component. The 
values for each subject in each component reflect network coherence; larger values 
indicate more synchronized dynamics across voxels, and therefore, greater coherence. All 
components had a positive skew, which was corrected through a log-transformation. 
Finally, all network coherence values were standardized to z-scores. Connectivity scores 
between networks were calculated as well, and then standardized to z-scores. Again, 
higher values indicated greater coherence in the connectivity between the networks. 
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4.4 Analysis 
 The intrinsic connectivity networks of interest were, in the original set of 
components, ICN 8 (the angular gyrus; Figure 6.1), ICN 12 (the anterior cingulate, insula, 
amygdala, and surrounding limbic areas; Figure 6.2), ICN 15 (the aCC and orbitofrontal 
cortex; Figure 6.3), and ICN 22 (aCC and pCC; Figure 6.4).  
  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Location of ICNs. Clockwise from top left. 6.1 ICN 8, angular gyrus. 6.2 ICN 
12, anterior cingulate, insula, and amygdala. 6.3 ICN 15, anterior cingulate and 
orbitofrontal cortex. 6.4 ICN 22, anterior and posterior cingulate. 
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 First, bivariate correlations were calculated between the ICNs and Neuroticism, N-
Volatility, and N-Withdrawal, after controlling for age, gender, WAIS scores, and a 
standard correction for movement. The movement correction is a summary statistic that 
reflects the average displacement across the six movement parameters (translational 
displacements along the X, Y, and Z axes, and rotational displacements of pitch, yaw, 
and row). Correlations between intelligence, creativity, the ICNs, and the ICN 
interconnectivity networks were also calculated; creativity was assessed through the 
CAQ, which was then log-transformed to decrease its non-normality.  
 Each network was regressed onto N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal, along with age, 
gender, WAIS, and the movement correction. Next, the inter-network connectivity values 
between the networks (e.g., between ICNs 8 and 12, ICNs 8 and 15, and ICN 8 and 22) 
were entered into a regression model with the same covariates. The regression was then 
repeated adding quadratic terms for N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal.  
 
4.5 Results 
 ICN 22 did not have a significant correlation with Neuroticism, N-Withdrawal, or 
N-Volatility; the other three networks correlated significantly with N-Withdrawal, and 
ICN 8 correlated significantly with Neuroticism overall (Table 11).  ICN 8 also correlated 
with log-transformed scores on the CAQ, but neither WAIS scores nor CAQ scores 
significantly correlated with any of the other ICNs or ICN interconnectivity (Table 12).  
The networks were also significantly correlated with each other (Table 13).  
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Network Neuroticism N-Withdrawal N-Volatility 
ICN 8 -.138* -.187** -.065 
ICN 12 -.080 -.141* -.008 
ICN 15 -.115 -.155* -.055 
ICN 22 -.003 -.098 .084 
ICNs 8 and 12 -.058 -.068 -.037 
ICNs 8 and 15 -.142* -.161* -.096 
ICNs 8 and 22 -.134* -.157* -.086 
ICNs 12 and 15 -.140* -.151* -.101 
ICNs 12 and 22 -.044 -.085 .003 
ICNs 15 and 22 -.004 -.053 .041 
Note. *Correlation is significant at p < .05. **Correlation is significant at p < .01. 
 
Table 12. Bivariate Correlations Between ICNs and Measures of Intelligence and 
Creativity, Controlling for Movement. 
 
Network WAIS IQ Overall CAQ 
ICN 8 .051 .149* 
ICN 12 .025 .104 
ICN 15 -.027 .059 
ICN 22 .049 .068 
ICNs 8 and 12 .007 .080 
ICNs 8 and 15 -.012 .013 
ICNs 8 and 22 .014 .052 
ICNs 12 and 15 -.013 .059 
ICNs 12 and 22 .050 .045 
ICNs 15 and 22 .012 .019 
Note. *Correlation is significant at p < .05. **Correlation is significant at p < .01.  
  
Table 13. Bivariate Correlations Between ICNs and Inter-ICN Connectivity, Controlling 
for Movement. 
 
Network 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. ICN 8 -         
2. ICN 12 .438** -        
3. ICN 15 .344** .605** -       
4. ICN 22 .227** .469** .582** -      
5. ICNs 8 and 12 .240** .280** .123 .100 -     
6. ICNs 8 and 15 .178** .184** .184** -.002 .439** -    
7. ICNs 8 and 22 .208** .168** .102 .060 .328** .501** -   
8. ICNs 12 and 15 .094 .528** .448** .238** .266** .153* .195** -  
9. ICNs 12 and 22 .124 .513** .407** .297** .255** .090 .217** .691** - 
10. ICNs 15 and 22 .078 .360** .376** .250** .220** .179** .260** .553** .658** 
Note. *Correlation is significant at p < .05. **Correlation is significant at p < .01.  
Table 11. Bivariate Correlations 
Between ICNs and the Aspects 
of Neuroticism, Controlling for 
Intelligence, Age, Gender, and 
Movement. 
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 Because multiple regressions are performed, it is necessary to have some correction 
for multiple tests. The most stringent correction for testing multiple networks is the 
Bonferonni correction, where the p-value of .05 divided by the number of tests. In this 
case, the p-value for within network connectivity would be .0125, and the p-value for 
between network connectivity would be .008. However, the Bonferonni correction 
assumes that tests are independent, which is not true for these analyses; the networks 
overlap and correlate. Further, Perneger (1998) points out that the use of this method 
means that the interpretation of findings is based on how many tests have been performed 
and that it can exponentially increase the probability of a type II error.  
 An alternative method is the Holm multistage procedure, which compares the test 
with the lowest p-value to .05 divided by the number of tests. If that test is significant, the 
next lowest p-value is compared to a value of .05 divided by the number of tests minus 1 
(Shaffer, 1995). In the case of the within network regressions, the first p-value would be 
.0125, the second would be .017; the between network regressions would begin at .008, 
followed by .01, and so forth. Because of the relatively small number of comparisons, 
this method will be used. 
 
Table 14. Regression Model for ICNs and the Aspects of Neuroticism. 
 
 
ICN 8 Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 Gender -0.124 0.031 15.820 1 <.001 
 Age -0.010 0.004 7.598 1 .006 
 WAIS IQ 0.001 0.001 2.182 1 .140 
 Movement Correction 0.405 0.127 10.198 1 .001 
 N-Volatility 0.022 0.022 0.961 1 .327 
 N-Withdrawal -0.079 0.024 10.427 1 .0011 
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ICN 12 Parameter B Standard Error Wald χ2 df p-value 
 Gender -0.087 0.031 7.965 1 .005 
 Age -0.007 0.004 2.562 1 .109 
 WAIS IQ 0.001 0.001 1.625 1 .202 
 Movement Correction 0.629 0.129 23.839 1 .001 
 N-Volatility 0.035 0.025 2.001 1 .157 
 N-Withdrawal -0.070 0.030 5.481 1 .0193 
ICN 15       
 Gender -0.101 0.030 11.504 1 .001 
 Age -0.006 0.004 2.633 1 .105 
 WAIS IQ 0.000 0.001 0.146 1 .703 
 Movement Correction 0.720 0.110 42.779 1 <.001 
 N-Volatility 0.017 0.024 0.498 1 .480 
 N-Withdrawal -0.061 0.027 5.215 1 .0224 
ICN 22       
 Gender -0.040 0.036 1.270 1 .260 
 Age -0.004 0.005 0.641 1 .423 
 WAIS IQ 0.002 0.001 3.377 1 .066 
 Movement Correction 0.727 0.120 36.551 1 <.001 
 N-Volatility 0.078 0.027 8.346 1 .0041 
 N-Withdrawal -0.090 0.029 9.288 1 .0022 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
1 significant at p < .0125; 2 significant at p < .017; 3 significant at p < .025; 4 significant at 
p < .05. 
 
 
 Using the Holm multistage procedure, all four networks had a significantly negative 
relationship with N-Withdrawal (Table 14). ICN 22 had a significantly positive 
relationship with N-Volatility (p = .004); connectivity in the other networks was not 
significantly predicted by N-Volatility. The quadratic terms were not significant for the 
within-network regression models, so this was not repeated for the inter-network 
connectivity. The first model was used to predict inter-network connectivity between the 
four networks.  Connectivity between ICN 8 and ICN 15, as well as ICN 8 and ICN 22, 
had a significant negative relationship with N-Withdrawal at level of p = .05; however, 
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no effect was significant at the more stringent correction of .008 (Table 15). Connectivity 
between the other networks (8 and 12, 12 and 15, 12 and 22, and 15 and 22) was not 
significantly predicted by N-Withdrawal or N-Volatility at the level of p = .05. In all 
cases, N-Volatility was not significant, and N-Withdrawal trended in the negative 
direction.  
 
Table 15. Regression Model for Connectivity between ICNs and the Aspects of 
Neuroticism. 
 
 
ICNs 8 
and 12 
Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Wald χ2 df p-value 
 Gender -0.055 0.027 4.284 1 .038 
 Age 0.000 0.003 .002 1 .962 
 WAIS IQ 0.000 0.001 .045 1 .832 
 Movement Correction 0.058 0.095 .371 1 .543 
 N-Volatility 0.001 0.019 .006 1 .937 
 N-Withdrawal -0.021 0.019 1.198 1 .274 
ICNs 8 
and 15 
 
      
 Gender -0.009 0.027 0.106 1 .745 
 Age -0.002 0.003 0.245 1 .620 
 WAIS IQ 0.000 0.001 0.064 1 .801 
 Movement Correction -0.279 0.078 12.883 1 <.001 
 N-Volatility 0.000 0.020 0.000 1 .983 
 N-Withdrawal -0.047 0.021 5.091 1 .024 
ICNs 8 
and 22 
 
Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Wald χ2 df p-value 
 Gender 0.016 0.031 0.270 1 .603 
 Age -0.005 0.004 1.718 1 .190 
 WAIS IQ 0.000 0.001 0.225 1 .636 
 Movement Correction -0.031 0.078 0.156 1 .693 
 N-Volatility 0.003 0.022 0.024 1 .876 
 N-Withdrawal -0.055 0.027 4.087 1 .043 
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ICNs 12 
and 15 
Parameter B Standard 
Error 
Wald χ2 df p-value 
 Gender 0.624 0.151 5.740 1 .017 
 Age -0.001 0.004 0.060 1 .806 
 WAIS IQ 0.000 0.001 0.006 1 .938 
 Movement Correction 0.194 0.124 2.443 1 .118 
 N-Volatility -.006 0.024 0.054 1 .816 
 N-Withdrawal -.048 0.025 3.623 1 .057 
ICNs 12 
and 22 
      
 Gender -0.016 .032 0.237 1 .626 
 Age -0.002 .004 0.223 1 .637 
 WAIS IQ 0.001 .001 2.271 1 .132 
 Movement Correction 0.394 .111 12.609 1 <.001 
 N-Volatility 0.026 .024 1.211 1 .271 
 N-Withdrawal -0.047 .025 3.629 1 .057 
ICNs 15 
and 22 
      
 Gender -0.024 0.036 0.457 1 .499 
 Age -0.001 0.004 0.035 1 .852 
 WAIS IQ 0.001 0.001 0.740 1 .390 
 Movement Correction 0.413 0.118 12.237 1 <.001 
 N-Volatility 0.039 0.028 2.043 1 .153 
 N-Withdrawal -0.046 0.030 2.366 1 .124 
Note. Bolded estimates are significant at a level of p < 0.05. 
4.6 Discussion 
This study provides more specifics as to the neural basis of N-Withdrawal. 
Neuroticism as a whole was negatively correlated with connectivity in several areas 
related to emotional regulation and cognition; however, when separated into its aspects, 
N-Withdrawal was primarily driving this effect. The non-linear model was not a better fit 
for this relationship. N-Volatility had no significant effect on connectivity in three areas, 
but in one region that included that anterior and posterior cingulate, it actually had a 
significantly positive relationship. This further reinforces the importance of separating 
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the aspects; if Neuroticism was examined as a whole, N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal 
would effectively cancel each other out, making it more difficult to observe significant 
effects. 
The consistently negative impact of N-Withdrawal on functional connectivity has 
implications for the neural basis of this trait. First, its effect on areas related to cognition 
(such as the angular gyrus and the orbitofrontal cortex) suggests a neural mechanism for 
the influence of Neuroticism on decision making and social cognition. Neuroticism 
correlates with increased sensitivity to punishment; this could be related to its effects in 
the OFC, which provides expectations for rewards and punishments of any given action 
(Schoenbaum et al., 2011). Its decreased functional connectivity in association with N-
Withdrawal could relate to decreased reward sensitivity that is observed in Neuroticism 
and particularly in Internalizing disorders. It could also connect to increased punishment 
avoidance, as the decreased connectivity might tie to an inability to correctly assess the 
potential risks of a situation. The aversion of individuals who are high in Neuroticism to 
ambiguous stimuli could also relate to an inability to assess the ambiguous stimuli. 
The angular gyrus is important for mental representations of others (Seghier, 
2013), and Neuroticism correlates with making more negative attributions (e.g., Cheng & 
Furnham, 2001; Barlow et al., 2014). The decreased coherence in the angular gyrus might 
reflect this relationship. Further, the decreased network coherence in areas related to 
emotional regulation—particularly the cingulate cortex—may relate to an inability to 
prevent negative emotions from intruding on cognition, and therefore negatively 
influencing cognitive performance. This may also serve as part of the neural basis of 
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rumination; the areas of the brain that are supposed to regulate emotional activity have 
decreased connectivity, which would manifest as an inability to set aside recurring 
negative thoughts or ideas. It also suggests a possible explanation for previous fMRI 
studies that find Neuroticism associated with increased blood flow to these areas: the 
reduced connectivity would make communication less efficient, which would then 
require more activity to have the same effect. 
The positive association of N-Volatility with functional connectivity in the 
anterior and posterior cingulate was an unexpected finding. It might relate to differences 
in emotional regulation techniques in N-Volatility compared to N-Withdrawal, and it 
further reiterates the possibility of the aspects having opposing effects. However, as this 
effect was not predicted a priori, the likelihood of it as a false positive should be 
considered until it is replicated in another sample. 
5. General Discussion 
 The protective effect of intelligence from most forms of psychopathology has been 
repeatedly demonstrated; the mechanism behind this effect is less clear. The effect of 
psychopathology on creativity is less consistent, and still less is known as to the 
mechanism. In both cases, examining the common personality profile that is associated 
with psychopathology—in particular, the trait of Neuroticism—has elucidated these 
connections and the processes behind them. Separating Neuroticism into its aspects—
which have different associations with psychopathology, as well as distinct underlying 
neural subsystems—has also clarified some of the observed contradictory effects 
observed in previous studies. 
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 The preceding studies reinforce the importance of separating the aspects of 
Neuroticism—as they sometimes have opposing associations with other traits—and in 
focusing on Neuroticism and its aspects as common underlying factors across different 
types of psychopathology. Cumulatively, these studies suggest that the aspects affect 
cognitive performance and creative achievements in different ways, and differentially 
correlate with the functional connectivity of the brain. They also suggest that N-Volatility 
and N-Withdrawal can serve as useful endophenotypes in the attempt to determine the 
etiology of psychopathology. 
 As the results of studies one and two mirror the relationship between specific 
disorders and these traits—for example, the relationship between bipolar disorder 
(associated with N-Volatility), depression (associated with N-Withdrawal; Quilty et al., 
2013), and creativity—they suggest that personality may be a mediating factor in these 
relationships. The effect of N-Volatility on cognitive performance suggests that the 
former explains some of the basis of the negative association between intelligence and 
Externalizing disorders. They can also account for some of the overlap and comorbidity 
in different types of psychopathology; for example, using N-Withdrawal as an 
endophenotype could help determine the neural substrate of shared variance in 
Internalizing disorders. The effect of N-Withdrawal on cognitive performance helps 
explain previous findings related to IQ and Internalizing disorders, specifically 
depression, and suggests a possible non-linear relationship. Finally, the third study 
suggests a neural basis for N-Withdrawal. N-Withdrawal correlates negatively with 
functional connectivity in areas related to emotional regulation, as well as cognitive 
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performance and decision making. Interestingly, these networks did not correlate with 
either creativity or intelligence, suggesting that they are uniquely related to N-
Withdrawal in particular. Although they do not explain the connection between N-
Withdrawal and cognitive performance, they do provide evidence for the neural substrate 
of N-Withdrawal. 
6. Future Directions 
 These studies provide evidence for the connection between Neuroticism, 
creativity, and intelligence, as well as suggesting possible neural correlates of 
Neuroticism. However, particularly with regard to functional connectivity, research is 
just beginning. Future studies will clarify the meaning of functional connectivity 
differences, and will further elucidate the connection between neural processes and 
particular phenotypes, such as N-Withdrawal and N-Volatility. The current study only 
found one significant effect for N-Volatility—which was not predicted, and therefore 
may represent a false positive—and future studies can determine functional networks that 
are particularly related to this phenotype, as it has a separate neural substrate than N-
Withdrawal. 
At the moment, the translation of neural phenotypes such as functional 
connectivity to broader personality traits that encompass cognition, affect, and behavior, 
is relatively unclear. Within the larger context of neuroimaging, it is difficult to explicate 
the meaning of neural processes associated with traits. Increased activity in a particular 
region might mean that the region is performing more of a process, or it could mean that 
the brain is performing that process less efficiently—both have been proposed as 
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plausible explanations. Increased network coherence also does not translate to a 
straightforward explanation in terms of brain function. Future research will clarify how 
the neural processes reflect observable traits and behaviors. 
 Substantive creativity research related to psychopathology is also—relatively 
speaking—just beginning; significantly better assessment techniques for creativity have 
assisted this process. The CAQ is a highly useful tool for assessing real-world creative 
achievements; however, in the current study, one major limitation is the age of the 
subjects. Presumably, the best time to measure lifetime creative achievement would be 
after most achievement takes place, and the current samples include relatively younger 
individuals, with significant achievements still ahead of them. Repeating the current 
study in an older sample may capture more of this variance and therefore better explain 
the connection between N-Volatility, N-Withdrawal, and the different domains of 
creativity. Alternatively, designing a measure that reliably assesses creative achievement 
potential in some applicable way might also be useful for younger samples. Further, as 
more creativity measures can be assessed while undergoing neuroimaging, a clearer 
picture of the neural processes that underlie creativity will present, which may also 
elucidate the processes which connect creativity to psychopathology and Neuroticism 
more generally.  
 Finally, the non-linear effect of N-Withdrawal on cognitive performances is a 
good parallel to the effects of state neuroticism; this model should be examined in other, 
more varied measures of cognitive performance. N-Withdrawal (and Neuroticism overall) 
had no effect on cognitive performance in the all-male sample; however, this difference 
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did not appear to be due to the different gender makeup of the sample, as interactions 
with gender were not significant in the other samples. Thus, the variables that might 
moderate the existence of the curvilinear effect remain unknown. The linear negative 
effect of N-Volatility was expected, given the negative association between disorders 
characterized to some degree by N-Volatility (such as Externalizing disorders and bipolar 
disorder) and reinforces the need to separate the aspects. In the future, neuroimaging of 
cognitive tasks could reveal more about the underlying neural basis of these effects, 
particularly if networks associated with both intelligence and N-Withdrawal were 
examined. 
The current studies also suggest that the “fitness cliff” model that pertains to 
schizophrenia (e.g., Nesse, 2004) could be useful in describing and explaining other 
traits. In an evolutionary context, some traits may be selected for as they are helpful up 
until a certain point; however, beyond a certain level of the trait in question (the edge of 
the “cliff”), it has an abruptly strong, negative effect on reproductive fitness. Applying 
this model to N-Withdrawal, the trait may be associated with improved cognition up until 
a certain threshold, after which it interferes with cognitive performance, possibly due to 
the development of psychopathology, and becomes detrimental. Its relationship with 
cognitive performance resembles the inverted u-shaped curve, similar to what has been 
observed with state neuroticism; however, the development of an Internalizing disorder 
(which correlates with higher N-Withdrawal) might more closely resemble the cliff 
function (i.e., a sharp drop in ability); further, the effects of N-Withdrawal on 
reproductive fitness might follow the cliff-shaped function. As with psychotic disorders, 
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where traits like apophenia encourage creativity until the disorder develops, which then 
interferes with creativity (and reproductive fitness), N-Withdrawal may enhance 
cognitive performance until a certain point, after which the disorder such as depression 
interferes with cognitive performance (and possibly reproductive fitness). Using the 
fitness cliff model to explain the effects of endophenotypes clarifies the effects on other 
traits, as well as suggests an evolutionary explanation for the endophenotypes. 
7. Conclusions 
These studies collectively tie together the effects of Neuroticism and its aspects on 
intelligence and creativity, and explore the underlying neural substrate of Neuroticism. 
They suggest that previous conflicting findings related to Neuroticism, creativity, and 
intelligence may be related to the opposing effects of the aspects of Neuroticism, as well 
as to non-linear relationships. N-Volatility has a positive relationship with creativity, 
suggesting that the trait is advantageous in certain circumstances, despite its association 
with psychopathology. N-Withdrawal may also be associated with better cognitive 
performance up to a certain threshold. Both cases suggest that personality plays a 
mediating role in the relationship between psychopathology, intelligence, and creativity; 
N-Withdrawal and N-Volatility are common underlying factors in etiologically related 
disorders, which manifest in different ways but share some genetic and neural substrates. 
Intelligence and creativity are both important traits for positive life outcomes, and 
further understanding of their relationship with psychopathology could have a positive 
influence on treatment outcomes. Further, as N-Volatility and N-Withdrawal may provide 
the causal basis for this relationship, understanding their effects and neural substrates will 
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elucidate the mechanism for these relationships. Better insight into neural functioning 
will positively influence treatment of mental illness related to Neuroticism and its 
aspects, and may help encourage development of creativity and intelligence. 
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